In an agonizing playoff drive that ran down to the wire, Jonathan Sanchez's maturation as a pitcher was arguably one of the most remarkable stories of the amazing 2010 season. After twirling a gem in Game Three of the NLDS, he was labeled by some as the third ace of the Giants' formidable rotation. Three shaky starts and a mental breakdown reestablished uncertainty for next year, but in his defense, he was facing two top-notch offenses without his best stuff. The several months of rest before Spring Training should be sufficient for his fatigued left arm, but his search for consistency will likely continue.
In years past, Sanchez flashed the repertoire of an elite pitcher, but struggled to command all of his pitches. At times he's tried to overwhelm opponents with only his blazing fastball, an ineffective strategy against major league hitters. He would panic with runners on base, and a leadoff walk would often spell the end for him. In 2010, these problems seemed to manifest with a lesser frequency. Instead of being lifted in the middle of the fourth inning, he would often grind through five or six frames to keep his team in the game. His much improved ERA of 3.07 further enforced this notion. Despite this significant change, many sabermetricians will argue that Sanchez did not improve upon his true performance.
Sabermetrics, or advanced statistical analysis of baseball, suggests that the element of luck is essential to the game of baseball. The luck trifecta for pitchers consists of three stats that are often attributed to chance: Batting average on balls in play, home runs per fly ball, and left on base percentage. While the accuracy of these stats is questionable, they are commonly used to determine whether a pitcher's performance is actually indicative of his ability. Numbers show that Sanchez was moderately lucky with regards to two of these three factors.
For the last two seasons, Sanchez's strikeout and walk rates have remained fairly consistent, as has his home run rate per nine innnings. The results of balls put in play, on the other hand, have seen considerable change. Sanchez's BABIP was an average .290 in 2009, but dipped down to .262 in 2010, giving him the seventh lowest mark for pitchers with more than 150 innings. (Matt Cain checks in at number five.) This particular stat indicates that luck played a factor in his success. On the other hand, Sanchez's home run per fly ball percentage in 2010 was nearly league average, despite starting half his games at a notorious pitcher's haven, AT&T Park. While he received his share of fortune on balls in play, he was not completely immune to several flyballs that barely cleared the wall.
The other factor that raises flags is an abnormal left-on-base percentage. The league average for this statistic is around 70%, but Sanchez managed a 79.5% rate. The explanation for this, however, is fairly simple. While the stat is highly luck influenced, studies show that strikeout artists are able to sustain a higher percentage, and Sanchez certainly fits the description. His strikeout rates are some of the best in the league, and a splendid 9.8% swinging strike percentage places him among high-caliber pitchers such as the Rays' electric young ace, David Price. A 79.5% rate is still out of the ordinary, but it is not as absurd as it may seem on the surface.
In conclusion, Sanchez's excellent season can be attributed to both luck and skill. It would be exorbitant to say that one or the other is completely responsible for his success. Sanchez's emergence as a quality pitcher should be taken with a grain of salt. While he has indeed developed into one of the best number three starters in the league, he won't become an ace until he finds the impeccable command and composure shown by his rotation mates. Fortunately, he is under team control for several more years and still has time to unlock his hidden potential. Fans should feel fortunate that Brian Sabean has never pulled the trigger on one of the many trades that would have sent Sanchez away from the Giants.
